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NOTES AND COMMENT
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Homestead: Alienation; Abandonment; Estoppel;-Article I,
Section 17 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides that "the privilege
of the debtor to enjoy the necessary~comforts of life shall be recognized
by wholesome laws exempting a reasonable amount of property from
seizure or sale for the payment of any debt hereafter contracted."
In pursuance of this section the statutes state "A homestead shall be
exempt from execution . . . . for the debts of such owner to the amount
in value of $5000"'
. ., and the section providing for methods of.
conveyancing says, "but no mortgage or other alienation by a married
man of his homestead exempt from execution or any interest therein,
legal or equitable, present or future, by deed or otherwise without his
wife's consent, evidenced by her act of joining in the deed, mortgage
or other conveyance shall be valid or of any effect whatever. ... "2
The plaintiff and defendants in Krueger "v.Groth et ux3 each owned a
homestead consisting of farm lands and buildings. By an oral agreement between Krueger, the plaintiff, and Groth, who, with his wife, is
a defendant, an exchange of the farms was decided upon and carried
out as to the occupation of the respective preniises.
After several months occupation of Krueger's former farm and
homestead, the defendants, the Groths, refused to consumate the oral
agreement by an exchange of deeds, contending that the oral agreement
was void for lack of the wife's joining in the conveyance of the homestead.
In an action for specific performance the trial court sustained the
defendants but on appeal the case went to the plaintiffs.
In this case the court bases its decision on the ground of abandonment and equitable estoppel. "The homstead exemption being a
privilege and not a title to land, it had lost, by defendants voluntary
acts, all existence or efficacy." -"Manifestly the defendants cannot have
the benefits of two homesteads at one and the same time."
Under a statute similar to our own it was said, "Where a husband
and wife orally agree to sell their homestead and the vendee pays the
purchase price, enters into possession and makes improvements with
the knowledge and consent of the wife she cannot successfully defend
in a suit for specific performance."4 In applying the doctrine of estoppel
the court does not confine itself to facts, representations, or concealments as of the time of-the transaction but also to subsequent conduct
relied upon by the opposite party to his damage.
.
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In the dissenting opinion reference is made to the many cases favoring a strict interpretation of the statutes as where a mortgage executed
by the husband to provide necessities was declared ineffective even
though the wife was living apart from him at the time and also 5 where
the court refused to correct a description in the mortgage so as to include the homestead when such inclusion was the clear intention of the
mortgagors and the only objection to such reformation was that the
wife did not join in writing.6
The books are replete with decisions similar to those quoted not only
from our own court but from almost every state in the Union.7
As to the abandonment of the homestead subsequent to the oral agreement it is said, "the contract sought to be enforced is concededly void.
The contract was void because at the time it was entered into the subject
matter was a homestead." In speaking of a like contract the court said,
The deed of trust executed by Busby without the joinder of his wife, as required by statute is not valid and its invalidity was not cured by subsequent
removal from the homestead whether such removal was temporary or permanent.
The validity or invalidity of the deed of trust was determined by the conditions
existing when it was executed and not by what occurred afterward.'

On the question of estoppel it is said,
If it should be said that the homestead right is a mere privilege which the
wife may waive or which may be lost under the doctrine of estoppel, a very
efficient way would be open to evade and nullify the statute. Such right is
placed high above the reach of any such dangers by the absolute disability to
alienate the homestead in any manner except by a joint conveyance of some kind
signed by the husband and wife.'

Previous to the enactment of chapter 45 of the laws of 1905 the
statute on alienation of homesteads read as follows: "No mortgage or
other alienation by a married man of his homestead, exempt by law
from execution shall be valid or of any effect as to such homestead without the signature of his wife to the same."
Under this statute the court held that a husband might alienate insofar
as the alienation did not interfere with the homestead right and that a
deed from him alone conveyed an equitable interest which entitled the
vendee to the legal title as soon as the homestead right ceased.'0
In 1905 the legislature amended the section to read as quoted at the
outset of this note. It would seem clear from this that it was and is the
intention of the legislature that the exemption statutes should be a protection of the home for the benefit of the entire family and the general
welfare of society. There is some slight suggestion that the decision
here is in accord with the modern trend of legislation removing the
common-law disabilities of married women hinting that if she be given
equal rights she should be charged with equal duties. We are inclined
to feel that the protection sought by the homestead alienation statutes is
'Herron v. Knapp Stout Co. 72 Wis. 553 40 N.W. 149.
' Gotfredsen Bros. v. Dusing 145 Wis. 659 129 N.W. 647.
(See list of cases at 95 Am. Stat. Rep. 921.)
"Cummings v. Busby 62 Miss. 197.
'Cumps v. Kiyo lO4 Wis. 656 8o N.W. 937.
" Conrad v. Swamb, 53 Wis. 372, IO N.W. 395; Ferguson v. Mason, 6o Wis.
377, 19 N.W. 925; Jerdee v. Furbish, I Wis. 277, 91 N.W. 661.
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not provided merely for married women as such but is intended for
their protection in their peculiar capacity as homemakers and the natural
heads of families.
The law has always lent its aid to upholding the sanctity of the home
and the family. Especially deplorable at this time when so many forces
are at work tending to destroy them is any decision or law which tends
to make easier the despoilation of these bulwarks of society.
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